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Sven Biscop 
The crisis in Libya is a textbook example of 
a  situation  in  which  Europe,  through  the 
European  Union,  should  have  taken  the 
lead  and  proved  that  it  is  an  actor  worth 
noting.  Security  Council  Resolution  1973 
authorizing  the  use  of  force,  the  most 
difficult  precondition  for  intervention  to 
fulfil;  regional  support  in  the  form  of  an 
unprecedented  request  for  intervention 
from  the  Arab  League;  absolute  clarity  in 
the US that it will not take the lead. What 
more boxes needed to be ticked before the 
EU  could  step  onto  the  breach  and  take 
charge of crisis management? 
Alas, if all external conditions were fulfilled, the 
vital internal condition was missing: European 
unity. Luckily for Europe, and for the cause of 
freedom in Libya, France and the UK took the 
lead  and  with  US  support  raised  a  broad 
coalition  of  North  American,  European  and 
Arab countries that started military operations, 
with  the  participation  of  EU  Member  States 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Italy,  the  Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden. But with Italy initially most 
reluctant  to  let  go  of  its  very  own  special 
relationship  with  the  Gaddafi  regime,  with 
Germany  in  New  York  abstaining  on  UNSC 
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1973,  and  with  a  number  of  Member  States 
maintaining complete radio silence, it proved 
impossible for the EU as such to contribute to 
the  military  operations,  let  alone  to  take  the 
lead  through  the  Common  Security  and 
Defence Policy (CSDP).  
 
As a result, the EU is near absent from the 
scene, in spite of strongly worded statements 
from the European Council and the Foreign 
Affairs Council requiring Gaddafi to relinquish 
power. The conduct of the military operations 
has  been  entrusted  to  NATO,  and  their 
political  direction  to  the  coalition  of  the 
willing.  Diplomatic  efforts  at  mediation, 
limited  as  they  are,  are  in  the  hands  of  the 
United Nations and the African Union. As to a 
long-term vision for Libya and the region, that 
remains very much to be discussed.  
 
Fortunately,  thanks  to  French  and  British 
leadership,  action  is  being  taken.  But  it  is  a 
shame that it could not be done through the 
EU. First, the action does serve the interests 
of  all  twenty-seven  EU  Member  States. 
Furthermore, the issue will end up on the EU 
agenda  anyhow,  when  the  long-term 
perspectives for the region are to be debated. 
The EU can yet benefit from this crisis, if it 
learns three key strategic lessons.  
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1. Stand up for your own Vital Interests  
That vital European interests are at stake in the 
Mediterranean behoves no further explanation. 
Trade routes, energy supply, migration are but 
the  most  evident.  The  Libyan  crisis  has 
demonstrated  once  more  what  we  knew 
already: nobody will protect our vital interests for us. 
Just like at the start of the Yugoslav conflict in 
the early 1990s, the US has signalled that it is 
willing  to  contribute,  politically  and  military, 
but not to take the lead. And rightfully so, for 
this  concerns  Brussels  much  more  than 
Washington.  
 
EU  capitals  will  hopefully  realize  that  more 
leadership is expected from the EU, at the very 
least in what it has dubbed its Neighbourhood.  
2. Think and Act Strategically  
Defending our vital interests requires strategy. 
The  first  strategic  choice  is  to  prioritize  the 
regions where those interests are most directly 
at stake, and act accordingly.  
 
The  Eastern  and  Southern  Neighbourhood 
definitely counts among those priorities. So do 
Central  Asia  and  the  Gulf,  and  maritime 
security  from  Suez  to  Shanghai  and  in  the 
future  probably  in  the  Arctic,  in  view  of  the 
interests  at  stake.  Sub-Sahara  Africa  can 
probably be added, given the continued need 
for external help with peace support. Another 
priority  is  assisting  the  UN  in  maintaining 
collective  security,  notably  to  uphold  the 
Responsibility  to  Protect  that  now  finds  its 
application  in  Libya.  Moral  responsibility  and 
defending our interests thus often coincide.  
 
Three  factors  explain  Europe’s  reluctance, 
erroneously, to think in strategic terms about 
priority regions.  
First, strategy is too much identified with the 
military. The aim is not to delineate a sphere of 
influence  in  which  gunboat  diplomacy  will 
uphold Europe’s interests. Rather the idea is to 
identify  regions  where  our  vital  interests  are 
most  likely  to  be  challenged  in  order  to 
provide  a  focus  for  a  long-term  strategy  of 
prevention,  which  in  a  holistic  and  multilateral 
manner puts to use all instruments of external 
action,  in  partnership  with  local  and  regional 
actors,  to  create  long-term  stability.  But  we 
must be aware that, as a last resort, precisely 
because these are priority regions for our vital 
interests, we might be required to take military 
action if no other means can work, and must 
do  our  permanent  military  planning 
accordingly.  
 
Second,  the  military  option  is  too 
narrowly  identified  with  EU-only 
military  action.  In  fact,  in  crises 
demanding  military  action,  depending 
on which partners want to support us, it 
can be implemented through NATO, CSDP, 
the UN, or an ad hoc coalition. Whichever is 
more likely to be effective in the case at hand. 
But  the  framework  for  the  command  and 
control  of  the  military  operations  is  but  a 
technical  matter.  Regardless  of  the  option 
chosen,  as  far  as  Europe  is  concerned  the 
foreign policy actor directing the operation at 
the strategic level will always be the EU, for it 
is through the EU that we make our long-term 
policies  towards  these  priority  regions.  In 
Kosovo European troops are deployed under 
NATO  command;  in  Lebanon,  under  UN 
command;  but  in  both  cases  Europe’s 
comprehensive long-term political strategy for 
the country is defined through the EU. So it 
ought to have been for Libya: up to the EU, 
not  to  a  coalition  of  the  willing,  to  assume 
strategic  control  and  political  direction  of  all 
actions,  even  though  the  military  operations 
are under NATO command, for eventually we 
will review the Neighbourhood Policy and our 
specific Libya policy at the EU level as well.  
 
“Nobody  will  protect  our  vital 
interests for us”   3 
 
 
Third, military action is wrongly identified with 
automatic  participation  by  all  Member  States. 
In fact, as the record of CSDP proves, exactly 
the opposite is true. There is no expectation in 
the EU that all Member States take part in all 
operations. But there is a justified expectation 
that  those  not  seeking  to  participate  in  a 
particular  operation  under  discussion  do  not 
block, but provided political support to those 
proposing it, if it serves the vital interests of the 
EU and all its Members. Thus in the case of 
Libya,  especially  as  the  EU  did  adopt  strong 
language calling for Gaddafi to leave, it could 
also  have  decided  on  implementing  UNSC 
1973 through a CSDP operation, under French 
or  British  command,  without  obliging  all 
twenty-seven  to  take  part.  Unfortunately,  the 
Council has only decided on a CSDP operation, 
if  requested,  to  support  the  humanitarian 
efforts,  which  is  more  likely  to  create  a 
perception  of  irrelevance  than  to  have  much 
effect on the ground.  
 
3. Get the Right Capabilities  
Acting strategically requires capabilities. In the 
military  realm,  European  capabilities  remain 
deficient. The Libyan crisis hopefully can spur 
EU Member States on to take action.  
 
Taken  together,  the  twenty-seven  EU 
Member  States  are  the  world’s  second 
biggest military actor, after the US. But 
those  impressive  overall  numbers  hide 
strategic  shortfalls  in  key  areas,  which 
the  operations  in  Libya  have 
highlighted. Precision-guided munitions 
(missiles), satellite observation, aircraft carriers: 
for  lack  of  sufficient  European  capacity,  US 
support  was  welcome  and  necessary.  The 
coalition of the willing could have undertaken 
the operations without, but it would have been 
slower, dirtier and nastier, with a bigger risk of 
casualties on our side and of civilian casualties 
in Libya.  
 
Unfortunately,  the  political  fallout  of  the 
Libyan crisis may negatively affect the “Ghent 
Initiative” for enhanced capability development 
that is now being discussed. The emphasis is on 
pooling  and  sharing  of  capabilities  and  task 
specialization,  in  order  to  enhance  cost-
effectiveness  and  operational  output,  and  to 
create budgetary margin to address the strategic 
shortfalls. While it must be noted that pooling 
can  be  organized  in  such  a  way  that  all 
participants retain maximal flexibility to engage 
in separate operations, there is a big risk that 
Member  States  will  now  not  be  willing  to 
engage in pooling and sharing with those seen 
as  unlikely  to  join  in  when  it  comes  to  real 
operations.  That  impression  can  only  be 
undone  by  those  so  accused,  including  by 
signalling their willingness to pool capabilities 
in substantive capability areas, to a substantive 
degree.  That  in  turn  will  create  the  political 
energy  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  “Ghent 
initiative”  becomes  a  long-term  process  that 
continues  beyond  this  semester,  in  order  to 
arrive  eventually  at  a  forum  for  effective 
strategic-level  dialogue  between  national 
defence  planning.  Only  through  CSDP  can 
such  military  convergence  be  achieved  as  the 
only  way  to  produce  more  deployable 
capabilities  by  all  Member  States,  which  will 
thus  also  benefit  the  two  military  most 
powerful Member States, France and the UK.  
“The picture is mixed: European 
countries  are  in  the  lead,  but 
Europe is not” 
One  specific  capability  in  which  the  EU  is 
lacking is planning and conduct. The EU does 
not have a permanent operational headquarters. 
As a result, it cannot do permanent planning, 
so that whenever a contingency arises specific 
plans can be produced quickly. And it cannot 
but  outsource  the  conduct  (command  and 
control) of an operation, either to a Member 
State  or  to  NATO.  The  Libyan  crisis 
demonstrates  though  that  the  availability  of   4 
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NATO is not guaranteed. And even though in 
the  end  Turkish  objections  were  overcome 
(though in future crises they will undoubtedly re-
emerge in view of Turkey’s new foreign policy 
stance), arguably conducting the operation under 
the NATO-flag, with all the connotations that 
carries  in  the  region,  has  negative  political 
consequences. The only EU Member States able 
to conduct such complex operations are France 
and the UK, and then only with difficulty. The 
inevitable conclusion is that if Europeans want 
to be sure they are able to act in every future 
contingency, the EU needs its own operational 
HQ.  Now  is  the  opportunity  to  set  up  an 
integrated  civilian-military  OHQ  within  the 
European External Action Service.  
 
Conclusion  
Today, the picture is mixed. European countries 
are in the lead, but Europe is not. Eventually, 
the EU will come back into the picture, for it is 
beyond  the  capacity  of  those  individual  EU 
Member States to set and implement long-term 
strategy  for  Libya  and  the  Mediterranean, 
grateful though one must be for them assuming 
leadership of the current crisis management. If 
the  three  strategic  lessons  listed  above  are 
learned and absorbed, the next time hopefully 
the EU will be in the picture from the very 
start, to the benefit of all concerned.  
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